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Abstract—Radio access network (RAN) slicing is an effective
methodology to dynamically allocate networking resources in 5G
networks. One of the main challenges of RAN slicing is that it
is provably an NP-Hard problem. For this reason, we design
near-optimal low-complexity distributed RAN slicing algorithms.
First, we model the slicing problem as a congestion game, and
demonstrate that such game admits a unique Nash equilibrium
(NE). Then, we evaluate the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the NE,
i.e., the efficiency of the NE as compared to the social optimum,
and demonstrate that the PoA is upper-bounded by 3/2. Next, we
propose two fully-distributed algorithms that provably converge
to the unique NE without revealing privacy-sensitive parameters
from the slice tenants. Moreover, we introduce an adaptive pric-
ing mechanism of the wireless resources to improve the network
owner’s profit. We evaluate the performance of our algorithms
through simulations and an experimental testbed deployed on the
Amazon EC2 cloud, both based on a real-world dataset of base
stations from the OpenCellID project. Results conclude that our
algorithms converge to the NE rapidly and achieve near-optimal
performance, while our pricing mechanism effectively improves
the profit of the network owner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the ubiquitousness of modern smartphones and
the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), the number of mobile
devices has seen an unprecedented expansion over the last few
years. The latest report by Ericsson Mobility forecasts that
the number of 5G subscriptions will exceed half a billion by
the end of 2022, including more than 1.5 billion IoT devices
equipped with cellular connections [1]. This massive increase
in the number of connected devices will necessarily result in a
staggering growth in cellular data traffic. For this reason, 5G
cellular networks are expected to meet stringent requirements
on ubiquitous connectivity, extremely low latency, and very
high-rate data transfer [2–4].
What 5G systems are going to be has yet to be determined.
However, there is wide consensus that 5G systems will single-
handedly cater to a plethora of different services, such as
automotive, mobile broadband, and tactile Internet, just to name
a few. Each service will have its own networking requirements,
which will ultimately require the network to be polymorphic
and seamlessly adapt to different constraints. To address this
challenging problem, the notion of network slicing [5–9] has
been recently proposed, where the physical and computational
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resources of the network are seen as a unique “object” that can
be “sliced” and “served” according to an entity’s current needs.
In this way, heterogeneous requirements can be served by
the same infrastructure in a cost-effective manner, as different
network slice instances can be orchestrated and configured
according to the specific requirements of the slice tenants.
Challenges. Network slicing does not just provide better
network performance, but it also enables realistic and profitable
business models in the mobile network ecosystem. In this paper,
we consider the problem of network slicing in the context of
radio access networks (RANs), where telco operators (TOs)
provide physical network resources to mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs), who periodically rent slices to provide
cellular network access to mobile users (MUs). While a sim-
ilar model is currently being successfully applied by Amazon
Web Services or Microsoft Azure in the context of cloud
services, slicing RAN resources is an intrinsically different
problem, since (i) spectrum is a scarce resource for which over-
provisioning is not possible; (ii) the network capacity is dy-
namic and heavily depends on the location of the MUs, among
other factors; and (iii) the agreements with MVNOs usually
impose stringent requirements on the Quality of Experience
(QoE) perceived by the MUs.
The main issue in designing RAN slicing algorithms is that
the most realistic problem formulations are provably NP-hard
[10]. For this reason, most of existing work has focused only
on the architectural aspects of network slicing [11, 12], with
a limited focus on algorithmic aspects. Only very recently
have a number of centralized algorithms for RAN slicing
been proposed [10, 13]. Although these algorithms achieve
optimality, they do not scale with the number of MVNOs and
RAN resources. This issue calls for the design and analysis
of near-optimal, lower-complexity algorithms for RAN slicing.
Another crucial aspect is that optimality is often achieved to
the detriment of privacy. Specifically, it is assumed that the TO
is provided with complete information regarding the MVNOs’
system parameters and preferences, for example, monetary
budget, number and location of served MUs, business strate-
gies, and so on. Instead, in realistic scenarios MVNOs may
be reluctant to disclose such sensitive information to the TOs.
Finally, centralized solutions do not consider the competitive
and selfish behavior of modern MVNOs, who will dynamically
adopt different strategies to maximize their own utility without
considering the broader needs of the network as a whole. This
implies that distributed algorithms are in general more desirable
than centralized solutions, as they are more likely to be adopted
by MVNOs in real-world RAN slicing scenarios.
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Contributions. In this paper, we investigate the challeng-
ing and novel problem of designing privacy-preserving, low-
complexity, near-optimal distributed algorithms for RAN net-
work slicing, where the MVNOs selfishly compete with each
other to acquire slices from the TOs while minimizing their
cost. First, we first mathematically formulate this problem;
then, we rely on the game-theoretical framework of congestion
games [14–16] to effectively model and analyze the competi-
tion among MVNOs. Next, we demonstrate the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) associated to the
game, and prove that its Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the effi-
ciency of the NE as compared to the social optimum, is limited
to 3/2. We formulate two distributed algorithms that preserve the
privacy of the MVNOs and provably converge to the unique NE.
Moreover, we propose a pricing algorithm based on a stochastic
iterative mechanism that allows the TO to optimize its profit by
adapting pricing policies to the current load on the resources
being sliced. Finally, we extensively evaluate the performance
of our algorithms through simulations and a practical testbed
implemented on the Amazon EC2 cloud [17], both based on a
real-world dataset of base stations (BSs) from the OpenCellID
project [18]. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed approach, as our algorithms converge to the NE rapidly
while achieving near-optimal performance.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the network scenario, while Section III
defines the RAN slicing problem. Sections IV to VII introduce
and analyze the network slicing problem as a congestion game,
and present the distributed and privacy-preserving algorithms
that compute the NE for the MVNOs in such game. Pricing and
profit issues are discussed in Section VII. Sections VIII and
VIII-D present the numerical and experimental results, while
Sections IX and X conclude the paper by discussing related
work and drawing conclusions, respectively.
II. NETWORK SCENARIO AND PROBLEM OVERVIEW
In this paper, we consider the network scenario depicted
in Figure 1, which is composed by a core network (CN) and
a radio access network (RAN). The CN is connected to the
Internet and is in charge of routing uplink and downlink traffic.
Furthermore, the RAN is composed of multiple heterogeneous
remote radio heads (RRHs). We assume that both the CN and
the RAN are owned and managed by a single TO. However, our
model can also be applied to the more general case of multiple
infrastructure owners. Given that RRHs are geographically lo-
cated at different areas of the network, the RAN can be divided
into multiple RAN clusters, which group together RRHs that are
close to each other.
In the considered scenario, the TO dynamically leases the
network infrastructure to multiple MVNOs, who do not own
any infrastructure and build virtual RANs to provide MUs with
networking capabilities [6]. Since RAN clusters are geographi-
cally isolated and autonomous, slicing policies are enforced on
each RAN cluster individually.
We consider the problem of generating autonomous virtual
RANs on top of the resources provided by the physical RAN
owned by the TO. A virtual RAN is thus referred to as a network
Figure 1. The considered 5G network scenario.
slice, since it represents a virtual “portion” of the physical
RAN. Resources that may be assigned in each slice include
available spectrum, antennas, computing resources, and so on.
In this scenario, it is realistic to assume the MVNOs will need
to provide the TO with some sort of payment based on the
number and type of resources allocated to their slices. Thus,
the slicing problem reduces to finding an allocation policy for
each MVNO, to minimize the cost associated to its slice while
ensuring that a predetermined number of MUs can be served.
Within each slice, MVNOs are free to assign resources to the
MUs according to their internal policies.
This problem can be approached in two different ways. In the
first approach, which we call centralized, the TO collects the
number of MUs that each MVNO would like to serve, referred
to as MVNO user load. Then, the TO computes the slices by
solving an optimization problem that takes the MVNO user
loads into account. Although simple in nature, this approach
suffers from a number of disadvantages. First, it requires the
MVNOs to disclose their user load to the TO, which clearly
raises privacy concerns as the MVNOs are usually interested in
hiding such information from external entities. Second, since
centralized approaches find the global optimum by mathemat-
ical optimization [10], they require significant computational
resources as the network slicing problem becomes intractable
as the number of MVNOs and resources increases [13]. Thus,
since the MVNO user load is dynamic in nature, the centralized
approach may fail to provide slices for the MVNOs before their
user load changes again and a different slice is thus needed.
In this paper, we take a different approach and tackle the
problem in a distributed way. Specifically, we design distributed
slicing algorithms such that each MVNO computes its slice
without revealing information to the TO or other MVNOs. Al-
though such distributed solution is necessarily sub-optimal, we
show that it is low-complexity (i.e., scalable) and approximates
the optimum solution by a factor of 3/2, a very small number. We
use the framework of congestion games [14–16] to ensure that
the MVNOs, although selfish and competing with each other,
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Figure 2. Roadmap to our theoretical analysis.
will nevertheless reach a solution (i.e., Nash equilibrium) that
will satisfy each MVNO. In order to increase the TO’s profit, we
propose an adaptive resource pricing algorithm. Fig. 2 provides
a roadmap of the following analytical sections.
III. RAN SLICING PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let us define M and C as the sets of the MVNOs and
RAN clusters, respectively. We assume that a set Rc of R
heterogeneous RRHs are deployed for each cluster c ∈ C, and
that RRHs can be classified into L classes according to their
performance and resource availability (e.g., macro, micro, pico
and femto cells). Accordingly, the set of RRHs in RAN cluster
c is Rc = (R(1)c ,R(2)c , . . . ,R(L)c ). For each RRH r ∈ Rc , we also
assume that the TO fixes a leasing price, here denoted as pr .
It is reasonable to assume that statistical information on the
expected number of MUs and their position in each cluster may
be obtained by exploiting real-time monitoring of the RAN
[19]. Given such statistics are time-varying and depend on MUs
mobility patterns, we assume that MVNOs change their slicing
policy on regular basis. For these reasons, we assume time is
discretized into slots, where t = 1, 2, . . . represents the slot
index, and the number of MUs and their position in each cluster
is assumed to vary at each slot.
Let Λr be the maximum amount of resources of RRH r
available at each slot1, and let Nr denote the number of MUs
that can be served by RRH r without any degradation in QoE.
In other words, if the number of MUs served by RRH r is
lower than Nr , then all MUs connected to r enjoy high-quality
communication. On the other hand, MUs would experience
congestion and/or poor performance if their number is equal
or greater than Nr .
The Nr parameter is specific to a given RRH and depends
on Λr , the desired minimum QoE level, the position of MUs
and their number at a given slot. As an example, it is easy
to observe that communication between distant RRHs and
MUs is expected to result in more collisions and errors, which
necessarily increases the number of re-transmissions and the
transmission power. In general, the value of Nr can be either
fixed by hardware [22] or estimated by the TO by analyzing
statistical information collected by using historical data such
as transmission patterns and activities of MUs. For the sake of
1In our model, we do not assume any specific model for Λr , since it models
a number of factors including computational, storage and communication
resources. For example, Λr might represent the number of OFDM symbols
available in OFDM-based network architectures such as LTE [20], as well as
spectrum or antennas [21].
completeness, in the following we propose a methodology to
estimate the value of Nr that accounts for QoE requirements,
resource availability, position and number of MUs. For the sake
of simplicity, henceforth we will focus on a given cluster c ∈ C,
and we will omit both c and the slot index t. We summarize the
most relevant system parameters in Table I.
A. Derivation of Nr
Let us consider an MU communicating with RRH r . The
received power at the MU’s side can be denoted as follows:
pr = k
(
d0
dr
)α
(1)
where k is a constant that accounts for transceiver design pa-
rameters such as antenna gains, channel characteristics, trans-
mission power of the RRH and operating frequency; d0 is a ref-
erence distance for far-field communication; dr is the distance
between the MU and r; and α is the path loss coefficient [23].
Specifically, α = 1 corresponds to the linear path loss model,
α ≤ 2 models the free space or indoor path loss, and α > 3
models urban and sub-urban scenarios.
Let us assume that the the RRH r serves all MUs in its
range with the same transmission power level. Accordingly,
the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) measured
by each MU at distance dr from r can be written as
SINRr =
pr
N + N˜r pr
(2)
where N is the channel noise power, pr is defined in (1), and
N˜r represents the expected number of interfering MUs in the
RRH coverage range [23]. Given that RRH r can not allocate
more thanΛr resources, the RRH may be modeled as an M/M/1
queue system with serving rate ofΛr . To avoid queue starvation
and enjoy the minimum SINR in (2), it follows that the arrival
rate of MUs must not exceed Λr . In other words, Nr should
satisfy Nr ≤ Λr .
Let µ ∈ [0, 1] such that µ·Nr is the rate at which MUs request
to access the available resources. By applying queuing theory
[24], the expected number of the MUs in the system is derived
µ ·Nr
Λr−µNr , while the expected number of interfering MUs in the
RRH coverage range N˜r is derived as
N˜r =
µ · Nr
Λr − µNr − 1 (3)
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By substituting (1) and (3) in (2), we obtain the maximum
number Nr of MUs that can be served simultaneously by r
while satisfying the minimum SINR constraint in (2) as follows:
Nr =
Λr
µ
· pr (1 + SINRr ) − SINRrN
pr · (1 + 2 · SINRr ) − SINRrN (4)
where pr is a function of the distance between MUs and r and
is defined in (1).
Remark 1. From (4), we notice that (i) the maximum number
of users that can be served by RRH r is proportional to the
available network resources Λr and decreases as µ increases;
and that (ii) Nr decreases as the minimum SINR level and the
distance dr increase. Furthermore, the variable µ can be varied
at each slicing slot and be used to model the time-varying nature
of cellular traffic at different part of the day. In Section VIII we
show the impact of µ on different performance metrics such as
the congestion level of the RRHs.
The above discussion provides an estimation of Nr when
MUs are located at a fixed distance dr from r . However, in
real networks MUs are expected to change their position within
the cluster continuously. Thus, statistical information on the
MUs’ mobility distribution can be used to provide a more
accurate estimation of Nr . Specifically, we model the distance
between MUs and RRH r as a continuous random variable
with probability density function fDr (d) and Nr in (4) can be
rewritten as a function of dr , i.e., Nr → Nr (dr ). Accordingly,
the expected maximum number of MUs that can be served by
RRH r can be computed as
Nr =
∫ +∞
0
fDr (τ)Nr (τ)dτ (5)
The value of Nr depends on the distribution fDr (d) of MUs
in the cluster, and might be considerably different if different
values of µ, SINRr, N,Λr are considered. Also, since RRHs
are located at different positions of the network, the function
fDr (d) is expected to vary across different RRHs.
B. Definition of Slicing Policy
We define as slicing policy a function determining how each
MVNO allocates its MUs to the available RRHs in a given
RAN cluster. More formally, a slicing policy for an MVNO m
is an allocation vector ξm = (ξm,r )r ∈R ∈ [0, nm], where ξm,r
represents the number of MUs in the cluster that the MVNO m
expects to serve through RRH r .
Ultimately, the TO generates the global allocation policy
ξ = (ξm)m∈M by considering all the allocation vectors for
each cluster. For any given allocation policy ξ , the TO gen-
erates a corresponding network slice over the available RRHs.
Specifically, the amount of resources at RRH r ∈ R provided to
MVNO m under allocation policy ξ is:
σm,r = s(Λr, ξ), (6)
where Λr is the maximum amount of resources of RRH r , and
s(·) is the slicing function. For example, a simple (yet effective),
slicing function can be provided by the proportional allocation
function [25]
σm,r =
ξm,r∑
l∈M ξl,r
Λr . (7)
Table I
SUMMARY OF NOTATION
Variable Description
M, R, C Sets of MVNOs, RRHs and RAN Clusters
M, R Number of MVNOs and RRHs
Rc Set of the L classes of RRHs in cluster c
Nr Num. of MUs served by RRH r ∈ R with guaranteed QoE
pr Leasing price for RRH r ∈ R
t = 1, 2, . . . Slicing slot index
nm,c (t) Expected number of MUs in cluster c for MVNOs m at slot t
ξm,r (t) Number of MUs of MVNO m served through RRH r
Γm(ξm) Set of RRHs in R selected by MVNO m
Θr (ξ) Set of MVNOs that have selected RRH r under policy ξ
ξm(t) Allocation vector for MVNO m
ξ(t) Allocation policy at slot t
Λr Amount of resources available at RRH r
σm,r (ξ) Available resources allocated to MVNO m under allocation policy ξ
φr (ξ) Congestion level on RRH r ∈ R under allocation policy ξ
piPm Weighing parameter for MVNO m
cCm(ξm, ξ−m) Congestion cost for MVNO m under allocation policy ξ
cPm(ξm) Monetary costs for MVNO m under allocation policy ξ
cm(ξm, ξ−m) Cost function for MVNO m under allocation policy ξ
G RAN slicing congestion game
Φ(ξ) Potential function for the game G under allocation policy ξ
ξOPT, ξNE Optimal and Nash Equilibrium allocation policies
CNE, COPT Social welfares computed under the NE and optimal allocation policies
γn Step-size parameter used in the learning procedure in (25)
Π(t) Profit ot the TO at slot t
Since Λr is a positive and finite real number, the relationship∑
m∈M σm,r ≤ Λr always holds for each r ∈ R. For any ξ , a
slicing rule σr = (σm,r )m∈M for each RRH r ∈ R is derived,
and a slicing policy σ = (σr )r ∈R is obtained. For the sake
of simplicity, we also define Γm(ξm) as the set of RRHs in
R selected by MVNO m in its slice, and Θr (ξ) as the set of
MVNOs which have selected RRH r under slicing policy ξ .
More formally, Γm(ξm) = {r ∈ R : ξm,r > 0, ξm,r ∈ ξm} and
Θr (ξ) = {m ∈ M : ξm,r > 0, ξm,r ∈ ξ}.
IV. RAN SLICING AS A CONGESTION GAME
When designing optimum slicing policies, MVNOs must
also take into account aspects such as (i) the cost incurred
when leasing RRHs; and (ii) QoS-related metrics such as (a)
the distance of those RRHs from the MUs, (b) the congestion
level on each RRH, and (c) the availability of resources at
each RRH. Since MVNOs are assumed as selfish and interested
in reaching their own optimum slicing policy, and given the
RAN infrastructure is shared among MVNOs, slicing policies
belonging to the same cluster will necessarily affect each other.
For these reasons, congestion games (CGs) [14–16] become
the most natural choice to design and analyze efficient and
distributed RAN slicing algorithms. Indeed, by using the theory
of CGs, we are able to (i) demonstrate the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) associated to the CG;
(ii) prove that its Price of Anarchy (PoA) is limited to 3/2; and
(iii) formulate two privacy-preserving distributed algorithms
that provably converge to the unique NE.
We now formulate the RAN slicing problem as a congestion
game and we define the slicing cost function used by MVNOs
to select their optimum policy.
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A. Congestion Game Problem Formulation
Let us define and consider the following weighted congestion
game (CG)
G = (M, (nm)m∈M,R,S, (cm)m∈M) , (8)
where M is the player set (i.e., the set of MVNOs), nm are
the weights of the congestion game and represent the expected
number of MUs in the cluster for MVNO m, R is the resource
set, S = ∏m∈M Sm,c is the strategy space, and (cm)m∈M
is the cost function set, where cm will be defined in Section
IV-B. A strategy for MVNO m consists in the selection of the
allocation vector ξm. Hence, a strategy profile is represented by
ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξM ).
Figure 3. Example of the considered CG on a given cluster with |M | = 2
MVNOs and |R | = 5 heterogeneous RRHs.
Since the cost experienced by each MVNO depends on the
RRHs they select, the congestion game G has to be weighted
and to have player-specific cost functions. Furthermore, a slic-
ing policy is derived by allocating different number of MUs to
multiple RRHs in the cluster, implying that G has to be a CG
with splittable flows [26]. To summarize, the slicing problem
can be modeled as an atomic weighted CG with splittable flows
on R parallel links. Figure 3 shows a CG with two MVNOs.
In this example, five RRHs are divided into two distinct RRH
classes R(1) and R(2). Finally, ξm,r represents the number of
MUs allocated to RRHs m by MVNO m.
B. Definition of Slicing Cost Function
RRHs are heterogeneous in terms of type, position and
available resources (i.e., spectrum and computational power).
Thus, when selecting an RRH r , an MVNO m will incur in a
cost that depends on the following two aspects:
1) RRH Congestion. RRHs serving an excessive amount of
MUs are expected to provide low QoS to their MUs.
Instead, RRHs that serve fewer MUs might provide their
served MUs with better quality communication. There-
fore the RRH congestion should be taken into account.
The congestion level on RRH r under policy ξ can be
measured as follows:
φr (ξ) = 1Nr
∑
m∈Θr (ξ)
ξm,r . (9)
where Nr has been defined in Section III-A and depends
on several RRH-specific parameters such as the resource
availability Λr at RRH r and the quality of the wireless
channel. It is worth noting that the congestion cost not
only depends on the allocation policy ξm of MVNO m,
but it also depends on other MVNOs’ allocation policies.
2) Deployment Cost. A second cost term is the deployment
cost which MVNO m pays to the TO to add RRH r to
its slice. Such cost depends on the price pr associated
to RRH r . It models the revenue that the TO expects to
receive when renting resources to MVNOs.
The above two aspects can be considered by defining the
following resource- and MVNO-specific cost function
cm,r (ξ) = φr (ξ) + piPmpr (10)
where the weight piPm is a resource- and MVNO-specific param-
eter that weighs the two terms in (10). piPm can be used to model
a wide variety of network scenarios. For example, piPm = 0 can
be used to model a MVNO m that cares about congestion only
irrespective of the incurred deployment monetary cost.
The total cost incurred by MVNO m under allocation policy
ξ can be expressed as
cm(ξm, ξ−m) =
∑
r ∈Θr (ξ)
ξm,r cm,r (ξm, ξ−m) (11)
= cCm(ξm, ξ−m) + cPm(ξm) + cDm (ξm) (12)
where
cCm(ξm, ξ−m) =
∑
r ∈Φm(ξm)
ξm,c,r φr (ξm, ξ−m) (13)
cPm(ξm) = piPm
∑
r ∈Φm(ξm)
ξm,r pr (14)
In the expressions above, (13) measures the overall conges-
tion level experienced by all MUs served by the MVNO m
under the slicing policy ξ = (ξm, ξ−m); and (14) represents the
total monetary deployment cost of the requested slice.
V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we showed how the slicing problem
can be modeled as a congestion game G. In this section, we
solve G by computing the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game,
defined as follows:
Definition 1. A strategy profile ξ = (ξm)m∈M ∈ S is a NE
for the congestion game G if, for all m ∈ M, (ξ ′m, ξ−m) ∈ S it
holds that cm(ξm, ξ−m) ≤ cm(ξ ′m, ξ−m), where cm(·) is the cost
function defined in (11).
Thus, a NE is a strategy profile such that no MVNO can
further reduce its own cost function by unilaterally switching
to another strategy.
In the following, we will focus our efforts to address the next
four questions:
1) Does game G admit one or more NEs?
2) Is the NE efficient with respect to the optimal solution?
3) Can we design an efficient distributed algorithm that will
help the MVNOs reach the NE without interacting with
each other?
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Question 1) will be answered in Section V-A, while questions
2) and 3) will be answered in Sections V-B and VI, respectively.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the NE
We first introduce the concept of exact potential games in
Definition 2, and then we show that game G is an exact potential
game in Proposition 3.
Definition 2. The game G is an exact potential game if there
exists a function Φ : S → R such that cm(ξm, ξ−m) −
cm(ξ ′m, ξ−m) = Φ(ξm, ξ−m) − Φ(ξ ′m, ξ−m) for all m ∈ M,
ξm, ξ
′
m ∈ Sm, and ξ−m ∈ S−m, where S−m =
∏
k∈M,k,m Sk .
For each MVNO m ∈ M and RRH r ∈ R, let ηm,r be defined
as follows:
ηm,r = pi
P
mpr (15)
Proposition 3 (Potential Function and NE Uniqueness). The
congestion game G is an exact potential game with potential
function
Φ(ξ) =
∑
r ∈R
∑
m∈M
(
1
Nr
ξ2m,r + ηm,rξm,r +
1
Nr
∑
k<m
ξm,rξk,r
)
.
(16)
Furthermore, the congestion game G admits a unique NE.
For a detailed proof see Appendix A.
B. The Price of Anarchy (PoA)
In this section, we investigate the efficiency of the unique
NE of the CG. Specifically, we will demonstrate that the Price
of Anarchy (PoA) of the game is a small number. In particular,
the PoA is a metric which measures the efficiency of the NE
w.r.t. a social optimum solution, where the latter is computed as
follows:
ξOPT = argmin
ξ∈S
∑
m∈M
cm(ξ) (17)
In our considered case, let ξNE be the unique NE of G, the
PoA can be expressed as
PoA =
∑
m∈M cm(ξNE)∑
m∈M cm(ξOPT)
=
CNE
COPT
(18)
Since each MVNO aims at minimizing its cost function,
it holds that PoA ≥ 1. Specifically, PoA = 1 ensures the
global optimality of the NE, instead, PoA >> 1 indicate poor
efficiency of the NE. Even though many congestion games
have been shown to have unbounded PoA, i.e., PoA = +∞,
in this work we show that the PoA is upper-bounded by 3/2.
Specifically, in Proposition 4 we first derive a general result on
the PoA, then in Theorem 5 we derive a closed-form upper-
bound which only depends on the number M of MVNOs.
In line with [27], let β be defined as follows
β= sup
r ∈R
sup
ξ,ν∈S

∑
m∈M
ξm,r
(
cm,r (ξ)−vm,r (ξ)
)
+νm,r (vm,r (ξ)−cm,r (ν))∑
m∈M
ξm,rcm,r (ξ)

(19)
where vm,r is the first-order partial derivative of ξm,rcm,r in
(10), and is defined as
vm,r (ξ) = cm,r (ξ) + ξm,rNr . (20)
Proposition 4. The relationship CNE ≤ 11−βCOPT holds, i.e.,
PoA ≤ 11−β .
Please refer to Appendix B for the complete proof.
Theorem 5 (The PoA is upper bounded). The PoA is upper
bounded by PoA(M) = 3M+12M+2 . That is, the PoA increases
with the number M of MVNOs, and is upper-bounded by
PoA(+∞) = 3/2.
For the detailed proof see Appendix C.
It is worth noting that the result in Theorem 5 matches the
result in [28], where it has been shown that the PoA for atomic
splittable congestion games is bounded by 3M+12M+2 . However,
their result applies to cost functions which are only resource-
specific, i.e., cm,r = cr for all m ∈ M. In Theorem 5, instead,
we consider cost functions such as those in (10) which are both
player and resource-specific, thus extending the results in [28].
VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we propose two algorithms that provably con-
verge to the unique NE of game G. Specifically, in Section VI-1
we develop a best response approach to develop a mechanism
that computes a NE by solving a convex quadratic programming
(QP) problem. Section VI-2 will be devoted to the design of a
learning mechanism which provably converges towards a NE
and further reduces the complexity of the NE computation.
1) Best Response approach: We introduce the concept of
best response (BR) functions and then prove that algorithms
based on BR converge towards the unique NE.
The BR is a function that minimizes the cost of each player
m given the strategies ξ−m of the other players. Specifically, the
BR for player m is defined as
ξBRm = arg min
ξm ∈Sm
cm(ξm, ξ−m) (21)
An iterative algorithm where each player updates its current
strategy according to (21) is called a best response dynamics
(BRD). The following Proposition 6 holds.
Proposition 6. The sequential BRD converges towards the
unique NE of G. Furthermore, the BR of each MVNO m ∈ M
is unique.
Proof: Since G admits a potential function, from (16) we
have that any BR that minimizes the cost function of a given
player also reduces the value of the potential Φ. Therefore,
since the potential is bounded and always non-negative, the
sequential BRD is an improvement path [29] and will surely
converge towards the unique NE. Finally, let us note that
the cost functions in (11) are strictly convex in each player’s
strategy ξm. Thus, the BR of each MVNO is unique.
Note that Proposition 6 does not guarantee that the conver-
gence towards the unique NE is attained in a finite number of
iterations. However, potential games with continuous strategy
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space possess the approximate finite improvement path (A-FIP)
property, which ensures the convergence to an approximate
NE in a finite amount of iterations. Even though we cannot
guarantee the convergence in finite time to the NE, in Section
VIII we will show that such convergence is attained in a limited
number of iterations in many practical scenarios.
Proposition 6 shows that it is possible to converge towards
the NE through iterative BRs. The BR in (21) for any MVNO m
and any adversarial strategy profile ξ−m is obtained by solving
min
ξm ∈Sm
fmξm +
1
2
ξTmQξm (22)
subject to
∑
r ∈R
ξm,r = nm, ξm ≥ 0,
where fm = ( fm,i)i∈M and Q = diag
(
2
Nr
)
r ∈R
are a M-
dimensional row vector and a M × M diagonal matrix, respec-
tively. with
fm,r =
1
Nr
[
φr (ξ) − ξm,r
]
+ ηm,r (23)
and φr (ξ) and ηm,r being defined in (9) and (15), respectively.
An algorithmic implementation of the sequential BRD is
described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Sequential BRD
Input R; {(xr, yr ), pr, φr (ξ)}r ∈R ; Output The unique NE of G;
while Convergence is not achieved do
for each m ∈ M do sequentially
ξm = (ξm,r )r ∈R ← the unique solution of Problem (22);
end for
end while
Problem (22) is a strictly convex quadratic problem with
linear constraints. Accordingly, a solution can be computed in
polynomial time (typically in O(R3), where R is the number
of available RRHs). Furthermore, if the congestion level φr (ξ)
is publicly available, (23) guarantees that Problem (22) can
be locally solved by each MVNO without any communication
with the other MVNOs. Accordingly, Algorithm 1 computes a
NE in a distributed fashion.
2) A low-complexity learning approach: In the previous
section, we have shown that the BR of each MVNO can be
computed by solving a QP problem, which is generally solved
in polynomial time ≈ O(R3). However, if the number R of
RRHs is large, to compute a solution to Problem (22) would
anyway require a non-negligible amount of time. Motivated
by this latter discussion, in this section we provide another
approach that builds on learning theory to provide a low-
complexity approach to compute the unique NE of G.
Let us introduce the following exponential learning scheme{
zm,r [n + 1] = zm,r [n] − γnvm,r (ξ[n])
ξm,r [n + 1] = nm ezm,r [n+1]∑
k∈R e
zm,k [n+1]
(24)
where γn is the step-size, vm,r is defined in (20) and n is
the iteration indicator. Intuitively, the exponential map in (24)
generates values of the allocation variable ξm,r which always
lie on the boundary of the (R − 1)−simplex Sm. In Proposition
7, we show that (24) converges to the unique NE of G.
Proposition 7. Let ξ∗ ∈ S be the unique NE of G. If the step-
size γn are chosen such that
∑+∞
n=1 γ
2
n <
∑+∞
n=1 γn = +∞, the
exponential learning scheme in (24) always converges towards
ξ∗ from any starting point ξ(0) ∈ S. A suitable choice of γn is
γn =
1
nβ
, with β ∈ (0.5, 1].
Proof: Let us first derive the continuous time version of
(24) as follows: {
Ûzm,r = vm,r (ξ)
ξm,r = nm e
zm,r∑
k∈R e
zm,k
(25)
From the strict convexity of cm, it follows that vm,r is continu-
ously differentiable, and thus Lipschitz-continuous. Since vm,r
is always bounded, (25) admits a unique solution for any initial
condition ξ(0). From (16), we have that the potential function
Φ is strictly convex, which implies that Φ is also star-convex
with respect to the unique NE ξ∗. Accordingly, the theory of
[30] ensures that the unique solution of (25) also corresponds
to the unique NE ξ∗, and (24) converges to ξ∗ if
∑+∞
n=1 γ
2
n < +∞
and
∑+∞
n=1 γn = +∞. Finally, we have that γn = 1tβ satisfies the
above conditions.
The algorithmic implementation of (24) is described in Al-
gorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Exponential Learning Scheme
Input R; {(xr, yr ), pr, φr (ξ)}r ∈R ; Output The unique NE of G;
Set (vm,r )r ∈R,m∈M = 0; (zm,r )r ∈R,m∈M = 0;
while Convergence is not achieved do
for each m ∈ M do simultaneously
ξm,r ← nm ezm,r∑
k∈R e
zm,k
;
zm,r ← zm,r − γnvm,r (ξ);
end for
end while
As already discussed at the end of Section VI-1, Algorithm 2
can be implemented in a distributed fashion by only making
the congestion level φr (ξ) on each RRH publicly available.
Furthermore, in opposition to the BR-based mechanism in
Section VI-1, lines 5, 6 in Algorithm 2 have complexity O(1).
Since both ξm,r and zm,r have to be computed for each RRH
in R and MVNO inM, the overall per-iteration computational
complexity is O(RM), i.e., each iteration of Algorithm 2 can be
computed in linear time.
In Proposition 7, we have shown that the learning scheme
in (24), and thus Algorithm 2, converges to the unique NE of
the game if some conditions on the step-size γn are satisfied.
As an example, a suitable choice of the step-size is γn = 1nβ .
Though this latter setting guarantees the convergence of the
learning scheme, it might generate slow-convergent dynamics.
To overcome this issue, it has been shown in [31] that the
convergence process can be improved by using fixed values of
the step-size. Although the convergence for this latter approach
cannot be theoretically proven, using a fixed step-size still
allows Algorithm 2 to converge to the NE with high probability.
Accordingly, in this paper we will only consider fixed step-size
rules, and we refer the interested readers to [31] for a more
detailed discussion on the impact of different step-size rules on
the convergence of the exponential learning scheme (24).
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VII. PRICING POLICIES
In the previous sections, we have shown that the developed
algorithm does not require perfect knowledge with respect
to MVNOs’ parameters, and effectively preserves the privacy
of all MVNOs. In addition, although the proposed algorithm
has limited complexity, we have proven that close-to-optimal
solutions can be obtained with no need to run complex and
time-consuming centralized approaches at the TO side. Despite
the above important properties, another relevant issue that has
not yet been considered is related to pricing policies enforced
by the TO and their impact on the achievable profit.
It is worth noting that the set of MVNOs, the availability of
RRHs and the position and number of MUs in each cluster vary
at each slot t. In such a dynamic scenario, it is straightforward to
show that static pricing policies could fail to provide high profit
to the TO. On the contrary, adaptive pricing policies are more
suited to deal with time-varying systems such as the one we
are considering in this paper. For this reason, in this section we
focus on adaptive pricing policies, and we propose a stochastic-
based algorithm that exploits past observations to adapt the
pricing policy at future slots.
Let us focus on a given cluster c. Furthermore, let ξ∗(t) =
(ξ∗m,r (t))m∈M,r ∈R be the unique NE of G at slot t, and let nr (t)
be the number of MUs served through RRH r at the NE. We
have that
nr (t) =
∑
m∈M
ξ∗m,r (t). (26)
The profit of the TO is defined as
Π(t) =
∑
r ∈R
pr (t)nr (t) − C(nr (t)), (27)
where C(nr (t)) is the cost experienced by the TO to manage
nr (t)MUs at RRH r .
The allocation variables ξ∗m,r are obtained by iteratively
executing either Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. Unfortunately,
there is no closed-form for those variables, which makes it hard
to predict the behavior of the MVNOs, and the actual allocation
of the MUs. Also, ξ∗m,r depends on the weighting parameters
piPm . Those values are not known by the TO and might vary
at each slot t. Therefore, an adaptive pricing policy should be
considered such that the price pr can be updated at each slot t.
In this paper, we propose the following stochastic-based
approximation pricing mechanism
pr (t + 1) = pr (t) + σ [nr (t) − nr (t − 1)] , (28)
where σ > 0 is a fixed step-size used to weigh the two terms
in the stochastic procedure. The proposed pricing scheme in
(28) works as follows. If nr (t) > nr (t − 1), i.e., the number nr
of MUs served through RRH r has been increased in the last
slot, then the price at the next slot is increased as well, i.e.,
pr (t + 1) > pr (t). Otherwise, if nr (t) < nr (t − 1), the price is
decreased, and pr (t + 1) < pr (t).
Furthermore, since the achieved profit must always be non-
negative, the condition pr (t + 1) ≥ C(nr (t)) has to be satisfied
for each RRH r . Since the stochastic procedure in (28) might
generate a price pr (t + 1) that violates the above constraint,
a minimum value pr (t + 1) = C(nr (t)) is considered at each
iteration of (28).
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate on the performance of the
proposed congestion game-based slicing mechanism through
numerical simulation and experimental results. To emulate a
realistic network setup, in our simulations we have extracted
a cluster R(FULL) of multiple RRHs deployed in Boston, MA
(USA) from the OpenCellID database [32]. A cluster consisting
of 100 RRHs, and the position of each RRH is illustrated
in Fig. 4. We assume that the density of wireless devices in
the considered cluster equals the population density in Boston
and is set to 5000 devices/km2 [33]. Furthermore, we consider
the case where a set M of M = 20 MVNOs are willing to
competitively deploy RAN slices to provide MUs with wireless
access to the internet. We assume that each MVNO m serves
the same number nm of devices. Hence, the density of wireless
devices served by each MVNO is 5000/M devices/km2.
We assume that all RRHs are LTE base stations operating
at 2.4GHz. The path-loss exponent in (1) is set to α = 3,
e.g., urban scenario, and the channel noise power is N =
−174dBm/Hz [31]. We consider isotropic antennas with an-
tenna gain equal to 3dBi and a reference distance d0 = 1m [34].
Thus, the k parameter in (1) is k = 9.89 · 10−5 [23].
We assume that the amount of available resources at each
RRH r , i.e., Λr , is represented by the number of LTE Resource
Elements (RE) within an LTE Resource Block (RB). Specif-
ically, we assume that each RB consists of sr = 7 OFDM
symbols transmitted over cr = 12 subcarriers for all r ∈ R.
Note that the number of available RBs, and thus Λr depends
on the LTE channel bandwidth. Specifically, we have that Λr =
NRB · sr · cr , where NRB ∈ {25, 50, 100} represents the number
of available RBs in the LTE system when the bandwidth is set
to 5, 10, and 20 MHz, respectively. Unless otherwise stated,
we assume b = 20MHz. That is, Λr = 100 REs are available
for MU transmission at each RRH. Furthermore, to investi-
gate the impact of different minimum Quality of Experience
(QoE) levels on the performance of the slicing mechanism,
in our simulations we consider three different minimum SINR
requirements such that SINRr ∈ {−5, 0, 5} dB.
The price pr associated to each RRH r ∈ R(FULL) is assumed
to be generated according to a normal distribution with mean
value µp = 10 Price Units (PU) and standard deviation σp = 4
PU. Instead, the weight piPm in (10) and the access rate µ of MUs
in (4) are assumed to be uniformly distributed and are randomly
generated at each simulation run. More in detail, piPm takes value
in [0, piP], with piP = 5 · 10−4, while µ ∈ [0, 1].
To investigate the impact of the number R of RRHs deployed
in the network on the achievable performance of the network,
for any given R ∈ Z, in our simulations we generate a subset
R ⊆ R(FULL) of R RRHs which are randomly picked from
R(FULL). The results presented in the following are averaged
over 2000 independent simulation runs. The 95% confidence
intervals are not shown when below 2% of the average.
A. PoA and Convergence Speed Analysis
We first investigate the performance of the proposed RAN
slicing algorithms as compared to an algorithm computing the
social optimum as discussed in Section V-B. In Fig. 5, we show
the PoA of the proposed slicing solution as a function of the
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Figure 9. Average congestion level on each RRH
and deployment cost of a slice as a function
of the ratio R/M for different number of RBs
and minimum SINR requirements (Solid lines:
SINR = −5dB; Dashed lines: SINR = 5dB).
ratio R/M and for different values of NRB when µ = 0.8. The
figure concludes that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is small and
approximately 1 in all the considered cases, i.e., the proposed
solution provides near-optimal slicing of the network resources
even though the cluster consists of approximately 100 RRHs.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows that the proposed solution achieves
better performance in terms of optimality gap when a small
number of RBs is considered.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of the weighing parameter piPm on
the cost function (11) of the PoA. The weight piPm is uniformly
distributed in [0, piP]. Accordingly, in Fig. 6 we let the upper-
bound piP vary for different values of the minimum SINR
requirement. Fig. 6 clearly shows the existence of two distinct
regions;the first region is associated to small values of piP ,
i.e., those network scenarios where MVNOs primarily aim at
minimizing the congestion cost in (11). In this case, the PoA
increases until a maximum value is attained. Instead, when
higher values of piP are considered, i.e., the deployment cost
associated to each slice is no more negligible, the PoA asymp-
totically decreases to one until near-optimality is achieved.
Fig. 7 compares the execution time of the solution proposed
in this paper. Specifically, we compare the time needed by
a centralized algorithm to compute an optimal solution, and
that needed by Algorithms 1 and 2 to compute a NE. The
results conclude that the centralized algorithm (dotted lines)
suffers from severe complexity issues when dense networks
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Figure 10. Average congestion level on each RRH and deployment cost as
a function of µ for different values of the minimum SINR requirement and
number of RRHs (Solid lines: R = 20; Dashed lines: R = 100).
are considered. On the contrary, both the BRD (dashed lines)
and learning (solid) algorithms show faster convergence rate.
Furthermore, Algorithm 1 still requires to solve the QP problem
(22), which usually has polynomial computational complexity.
Instead, Algorithm 2 has linear per-iteration and per-user com-
plexity, which results in faster convergence towards the NE.
To investigate the convergence speed of Algorithm 2 under
the fixed step-size rule, in Fig. 8 is shown the number of
iterations needed by the learning algorithm to converge to
the NE as a function of the value of the step-size parameter
for different minimum SINR requirements and values of the
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Figure 11. Average congestion level on each RRH and deployment cost as
a function of piPm for different values of the minimum SINR requirement and
number of RRHs (Solid lines: R = 20; Dashed lines: R = 50).
number R of RRHs. It is worth noting that the higher the
value of the step-size, the higher the convergence speed of
the algorithm. Furthermore, the convergence of Algorithm 2 is
slowed down when the number R of RRHs is large. However,
by increasing the value of the fixed step-size, the convergence
speed is reduced even in those scenarios where the number of
RRHs and MVNOs is high.
B. Congestion and Deployment Costs Analysis
Fig. 9 shows the impact of the ratio R/M on both the
average congestion and the deployment cost of the network for
different values of the number of RBs and the minimum SINR
requirement when µ = 0.8 and piP = 5 · 10−2. Specifically,
the congestion at each RRH is evaluated as in (9). Instead, the
deployment cost of each MVNO m ∈ M is computed according
to (14) and then normalized by the corresponding weight piPm to
obtain the actual monetary cost. The figure concludes that the
congestion is decreasing as a function of R/M . Intuitively, this
is because the deployment of additional RRHs on the network
allows the MVNOs to generate RAN slices which contain
different RRHs, thus inevitably reducing the congestion level
on those RRHs. Furthermore, it is shown that the deployment
cost decreases as well when a larger number of RRHs are
deployed. In this case, MVNOs can select those RRHs with a
low price pr , thus reducing the overall monetary expenditure.
Fig. 9 also shows that when SINR = 5dB (dashed lines), both
the congestion level and the deployment cost of the network are
higher as compared to the case where SINR = −5dB (solid
lines). In other words, higher values of the minimum SINR
requirements reduce the maximum number of MUs that can be
served by each RRH, which, on average, leads to higher values
of congestion and deployment cost.
From (4), the number Nr of MUs that can be served with
high QoE by each RRH decreases as the access rate µ of
MUs increases. As a consequence, the congestion on each RRH
increases due to the high traffic demand generated by MUs.
This phenomenon is depicted in Fig. 10 where we show the
average congestion level on each RRH and deployment cost of a
slice as a function of the access rate µ for different values of the
minimum SINR requirement and R. Intuitively, the congestion
increases when both µ and the minimum SINR level are high,
and a small number of RRHs is deployed. Accordingly, to
support the high traffic demand, MVNOs add more RRHs to
their slice, which increases the deployment cost of each slice.
The impact of piPm on the congestion level of the sliced
network is investigated in Fig. 11, where we show the average
congestion level and deployment cost as a function of piP for
different values of the minimum SINR requirement and number
of RRHs when µ = 0.8. The lowest values of congestion are
achieved when piP = 0. In this case, from (11) we have that the
proposed solution computes a NE that individually minimizes
the congestion level on each slice. Accordingly, such a setting
produces low congested slices. On the contrary, the average
congestion increases when piP increase as well. As expected,
the average congestion when only few RRHs are available (i.e.,
dotted lines) is higher than the case where a high number R of
RRHs is deployed on the network (i.e., dashed lines). Fig. 11
also shows that the deployment cost of the slices decreases
as piP increases. Such a result stems from the fact that, by
increasing the weight parameter, MVNOs are more affected
by deployment costs and converge towards more conservative
slicing strategies to avoid high monetary expenses.
C. Profit Analysis
In this section, we investigate the profit achieved by the
TO and we compare different pricing policies. Specifically, we
consider three different pricing schemes as follows:
• Uniform Pricing: all the RRHs in R are equally priced,
i.e., a fixed price equal to pr = µp is enforced on each
RRH r ∈ R;
• Weighted Pricing: the price enforced on each RRH is
proportional to Nr . Specifically, the price pr for the RRH
r ∈ R is set to pr = µp Nrmax
e∈R
Ne
. Under this pricing policy,
the TO fixes higher prices to those RRHs which can serve
a higher number Nr of devices simultaneously;
• Adaptive Pricing: this policy has been introduced and
discussed in Section VII. Intuitively, at each slot t, the
price of RRH r is updated according to (28) by considering
the congestion level on r at slot t − 1. From (28), it can be
shown that the adaptive scheme will eventually converge
towards a stable pricing policy when t →∞.
The profit achieved by the TO is shown in Fig. 12 as a
function of the mean value µp for different pricing schemes.
Since the proposed adaptive pricing model updates the price
of the RRHs at each slicing slot t, in Fig. 12 we show the
profit achieved by the TO when t → ∞. As expected, the
profit achieved by the TO increases when the value of µp
increases as well, and it is shown that the proposed pricing
model outperforms the other mechanisms.
D. Experimental Results
To understand the impact of our system in real-world de-
ployments, Fig. 13 shows the experimental results obtained by
executing the learning algorithm on a testbed deployed on the
Amazon Elastic Computing (EC2) cloud service. Specifically,
we have deployed the TO’s code on a t2.micro instance, having
1 virtual CPU, one 1 GByte of RAM with 3.3GHz clock
speed. We have deployed the code implementing the MVNO’s
slicing policy learning algorithm on an iMac desktop computer
located on Northeastern University campus. As we can see from
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Fig. 13, the learning algorithm reaches a NE in a limited amount
of time (less that 13 seconds for 50 RRHs and 40 MVNOs),
despite the overhead due to communication between the TO
and the MVNOs.
In Fig. 14, we show how the proposed RAN slicing algorithm
adapts to network changes over time when M = 3 and R = 10.
We assume that the number nm(t) of MUs served by MVNO
m and their position changes over time. Specifically, every 50
iterations of Algorithm 2, we randomly generate a new network
configuration by updating both the number of MUs and their
expected position in the cluster. Accordingly, Fig. 14 shows
the average congestion level on each RRH in the network at
each iteration of Algorithm 2. It is worth noting that Algorithm
2 quickly adapts to network changes and rapidly converges
towards a NE in few iterations even though the network con-
figuration changes over time.
IX. RELATED WORK
Due to its capability to enable agile and efficient sharing of
wireless network resources in 5G systems, the network slic-
ing problem has attracted increasing attention in the literature
[10, 13, 35–37]. Network slicing is not trivial, and it can be
shown that in general it is NP-hard [10]. Centralized solutions
have been proposed for both the slicing of both the backbone
and RAN portions of the network [10, 13, 38, 39], but they gen-
erally require perfect knowledge of the network configuration
and suffers from high complexity issues. As a consequence, a
variety of low-complexity heuristic and distributed approaches
have been proposed [40–42]. However, the above solutions do
not consider the adversarial behavior of virtual operators, which
makes it hard to implement them in competitive scenarios
where privacy must be preserved among multiple entities.
It is worth noting that many instances of the network slic-
ing problem can actually be reduced to the so-called Virtual
Network Embedding (VNE) problem [43], which consists in
the problem of generating a set of virtual networks upon a
shared physical infrastructure while satisfying a given set of
constraints. Unfortunately, the VNE problem is NP-hard. Thus,
to design effective algorithms with low computational complex-
ity, a variety of centralized and distributed heuristic approaches
have been proposed in the literature [43]. However, all of those
solutions are not well-suited to deal with the competitive slicing
of the RAN, where information on the expected number of users
and their distribution in the network is available. Thus, they
cannot be straightforwardly applied to the RAN slicing problem
we are tackling in this paper.
Competition among virtual operators has been recently con-
sidered in [25], where game-theoretical tools have been effec-
tively exploited to address the RAN slicing problem. In [25],
a RAN slicing game is developed, where the available RAN
resources are allocated to the MUs through an auction-based
mechanism which competitively maximizes the data rate of
each slice while guaranteeing a certain level of fairness.
Though the problem tackled in [25] is similar to that ad-
dressed in this paper, there are several fundamental differences.
First, in [25] a fixed share of RAN resources is assigned to
each MVNO a-priori, and the auction game is then played
by the MVNOs to decide on how to divide those resources
to the mobile users. In our paper, conversely, the share of
RAN resources allocated to each MVNO has been obtained
as a consequence of a non-cooperative game played among
the competing MVNOs. Another important difference is that
perfect knowledge about the presence of users is assumed in
[25]. In our paper, instead, we have relaxed this assumption by
assuming that only statistical information on the presence and
position of the users is available.
In the previous sections, we have emphasized the importance
of deriving theoretical bounds on the efficiency of the NE,
and designing effective distributed and convergent algorithms.
Due to their interesting properties with respect to the above
issues, congestion games [16], and their application to many
networking problems such as the network service chaining [15]
and load balancing [44], have been investigated in the literature
[14, 26, 28, 45–47].
In this paper, we have leveraged on a particular class of
congestion games, i.e., the atomic splittable congestion games.
Although the uniqueness of the NE for this class of games is a
well-known result in the literature, how to efficiently compute
a NE is still a challenging issue. Closed-form solutions have
been derived in [45], which however only hold for resource-
specific cost functions. When closed-form solutions cannot be
derived, then traditional sequential BRD have been considered
[46]. However, those approaches generally require to solve QP
problems, and are guaranteed to converge to the unique NE only
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after an infinite number of iterations. Recently, a quantization
approach which can compute the NE in a finite amount of time
has been proposed in [26]. However, it suffers from highly
polynomial complexity, which makes it hard to implement it
in dynamic scenarios. Upper-bounds on the PoA of atomic
congestion games have been investigated in [28] and [47], but
they only apply to the case of resource-specific cost functions.
If compared to the above literature on atomic congestion
games, in this work we have proposed a simple low-complexity
learning algorithm where each MVNO iteratively updates its
strategy to provably converge to the unique NE. We have further
derived an upper-bound on the PoA of the class of atomic
splittable congestion games where resource and player-specific
cost functions are considered, thus extending the results in [28]
and [47]. Specifically, we have proved that the PoA for this
particular class of cost functions matches the PoA of atomic
splittable congestion games where only resource-specific cost
functions are considered [28].
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have leveraged congestion games and learn-
ing mechanisms to design a distributed solution to the wireless
network slicing problem. The proposed solution accounts for
the limited availability of wireless resources and considers
several aspects such as congestion, deployment costs and dis-
tance among the RRHs and MUs. We have shown that the
proposed solution achieves near-optimal global performance
with limited computational complexity while preserving the
privacy of MVNOs. Numerical and experimental results have
shown the effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of
cost reduction, scalability and convergence time.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3 (Potential Function and NE Unique-
ness)
Proof: The cost functions in (11) are strictly convex in
each player’s strategy ξm. Thus, the general theory of [48] on
concave games ensures the existence of at least one NE.
To prove that G is an exact potential game, we must show
that cm(ξm, ξ−m) − cm(ξ ′m, ξ−m) = Φ(ξm, ξ−m) − Φ(ξ ′m, ξ−m)
for all m ∈ M and (ξm, ξ−m), (ξ ′m, ξ−m) ∈ S.
Let us consider the j-th MVNO in M, and consider two
allocation profiles (ξ j, ξ−j) and (ν j, ν−j) such that ξ−j = ν−j
and ξ j , ν j . Since ξ−j = ν−j , we have
Φ(ξ j, ξ−j)−Φ(ν j, ξ−j)=
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
(ξ2j,r − ν2j,r )+ηj,r (ξj,r − νj,r ) +∑
r ∈R
∑
m∈M
1
Nr
(
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r − νm,r
∑
k<m
νk,r
)
(29)
Note that∑
m∈M
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r =
j−1∑
m=1
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r +
M∑
m=j
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r (30)
Since ξ−j = ν−j by assumption, we have that∑j−1
m=1 ξm,r
∑
k<m ξk,r =
∑j−1
m=1 νm,r
∑
k<m νk,r . Thus, the last
summation in (29) can be rewritten as follows:
∑
r ∈R
∑
m∈M
1
Nr
(
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r − νm,r
∑
k<m
νk,r
)
=
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
(
ξj,r
j−1∑
k=1
ξk,r − νj,r
j−1∑
k=1
νk,r
)
+
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
M∑
m=j+1
(
ξm,r
∑
k<m
ξk,r − νm,r
∑
k<m
νk,r
)
=
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
(
ξj,r
j−1∑
k=1
ξk,r − νj,r
j−1∑
k=1
νk,r
)
+
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
M∑
m=j+1
ξm,r
(
ξj,r − νj,r
)
=
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
[
ξj,r
∑
m,j
ξm,r − νj,r
∑
m,j
ξm,r
]
(31)
where the last step is obtained by exploiting ξ−j = ν−j . By
substituting (31) in (29), we obtain:
Φ(ξ j, ξ−j) − Φ(ξ j, ξ−j) =
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
(
ξ2j,r + ξj,r
∑
m,j
ξm,r
)
+
ηj,rξj,r −
∑
r ∈R
1
Nr
(
ν2j,r + νj,r
∑
m,j
νm,r
)
+ ηj,rνj,r =
cm(ξ j, ξ−j) − cm(ν j, ξ−j) (32)
which proves that the function Φ(·) in (16) is an exact potential
function for the game G. Note that the Hessian matrix of
Φ(ξ) with respect to ξ has strictly positive eigenvalues, which
guarantees that the potential function is strictly convex and
admits a unique global minimizer. It is worth noting that Φ(ξ)
is a potential function for G, and is convex on the convex set S.
Hence, the set of minimizers of Φ(ξ) coincides with the set of
NEs of G [49]. Since Φ(ξ) admits a unique global minimizer, it
must follows that the NE of G is unique.
B. Proof of Proposition 4 (Bound on the PoA)
Proof: Let us consider two allocation profiles ξ, ν ∈ S
such that ξ is the unique NE of game G, and ν is the optimal
solution of (17). From (18) and (11), we have
CNE =
∑
m∈M
∑
r ∈R
ξm,rcm,r (ξ) =∑
m∈M
∑
r ∈R
ξm,r
(
cm,r (ξ) − vm,r (ξ) + vm,r (ξ)
)
(33)
Since ξm,rcm,r (ξ) is convex in ξ , we have that vm,r (ξ)(νm,r −
ξm,r ) ≥ 0. Hence, by exploiting (19), (33) can be maximized as
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follows:
CNE ≤
∑
m∈M
∑
r ∈R
ξm,r (cm,r (ξ) − vm,r (ξ)) + νm,rvm,r (ξ) =∑
m∈M
∑
r ∈R
ξm,r (cm,r (ξ) − vm,r (ξ)) +
νm,r (vm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν) + cm,r (ν)) =∑
m∈M
∑
r ∈R
[
ξm,r (cm,r (ξ) − vm,r (ξ)) +
νm,r (vm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν))
]
+ COPT
≤ β
∑
r ∈R
∑
m∈M
ξm,rcm,r (ξ) + COPT = βCNE + COPT (34)
which implies that CNE ≤ 11−β · COPT.
C. Proof of Theorem 5 (The PoA is upper bounded)
Proof: Let us consider two allocation profiles ξ, ν ∈ S.
From (20), the numerator of (19) can be rewritten as∑
m∈M
ξm,r
(
cm,r (ξ) − vm,r (ξ)
)
+
∑
m∈M
νm,r
(
vm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν)
)
=∑
m∈M
ξm,rcm,r (ξ) −
∑
m∈M
νm,rcm,r (ν) +
∑
m∈M
vm,r (ξ)
(
νm,r − ξm,r
)
=∑
m∈M
νm,r
(
cm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν)
)
+
1
Nr
∑
m∈M
(
νm,rξm,r − ξ2m,r
)
=∑
m∈M
νm,r
(
cm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν) + 1Nr ξm,r
)
− 1
Nr
ξ2m,r (35)
For each r ∈ R, let Yr = ∑ νm,r and Xr = ∑m∈M ξm,r , where
ξm,r ∈ ξ and νm,r ∈ ξ . From (9) and (10), we have that
cm,r (ξ) = φr (ξ) + ηm,r = XrNr + ηm,r (36)
and
cm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν) = 1Nr (Xr − Yr ) (37)
From (36) and (37), (35) can be reformulated as follows:
∑
m∈M
νm,r
(
cm,r (ξ) − cm,r (ν) + 1Nr ξm,r
)
− 1
Nr
ξ2m,r =
1
Nr
∑
m∈M
νm,r (Xr − Yr + ξm,r ) − 1Nr
∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r =
1
Nr
(Xr − Yr )Yr + 1Nr
∑
m∈M
νm,rξm,r − 1Nr
∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r ≤
1
Nr
sup
k∈M
{
(Xr − Yr + ξk,r )Yr −
∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r
}
(38)
Note that
Yr (Xr − Yr + ξk,r ) =
(Xr + ξk,r )2
4
−
(
Xr + ξk,r
2
− Yr
)2
≤ (Xr + ξk,r )
2
4
(39)
Thus, the last term in (38) can be further maximized as
follows:
sup
k∈M
{
(Xr − Yr + ξk,r )Yr −
∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r
}
≤
sup
k∈M
{
(Xr + ξk,r )2
4
−
∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r
}
(40)
It is worth noting that (40), which is a maximization of the
numerator of β in (19), does not depend on the value of ν
anymore. Accordingly, we have that
β ≤ 1
4
sup
r ∈R
1
Nr
sup
ξ∈S,k∈M

(Xr + ξk,r )2 − 4 ∑
m∈M
ξ2m,r∑
m∈M
ξm,rcm,r (ξ)

≤ 1
4
sup
r ∈R
1
Nr
sup
ξ∈S,k∈M

X2r + 2ξk,rXr − 3ξ2k,r − 4
∑
m,k
ξ2m,r∑
m∈M
ξm,rcm,r (ξ)

(41)
where we recall that ξk,r ∈ ξ , and Xr = ∑m∈M ξm,r with ξm,r ∈
ξ .
By substituting (36) in the denominator of (41), and by
maximizing it by removing the term ηm,r , we obtain
β ≤ 1
4
sup
r ∈R
1
Nr
sup
ξ∈S,k∈M

X2r + 2ξk,rXr − 3ξ2k,r − 4
∑
m,k
ξ2m,r
1
Nr
Xr
∑
m∈M ξm,r

≤ 1
4
sup
r ∈R
sup
ξ∈S,k∈M

X2r + 2ξk,rXr − 3ξ2k,r − 4
∑
m,k
ξ2m,r
X2r

≤ 1
4
sup
t∈T
{
1 + 2tk − 3t2k − 4
∑
m,k
t2m
}
(42)
where tm =
ξm,r
Xr
, t = (tm)m∈M , and T = {tm ∈ [0, 1] :∑
m∈M tm = 1, tk ≥ tj ∀ j ∈ M}. Since Xr = ∑m∈M ξm,r ,
we have that (42) does not depend on r ∈ R anymore. Also, let
us note that the supremum of the function in the r.h.s. of (42) is
achieved when
tk =
3 + M
1 + 3M
and tj =
2
1 + 3M
∀ j ∈ M \ k (43)
By plugging (43) in (42), we obtain
β ≤ 1
4
[
12M2 − 8M − 4
(1 + 3M)2
]
=
M − 1
1 + 3M
(44)
From (44) and Proposition 4, we obtain that C
NE
COPT
≤ 11−β ≤
3M+1
2M+2 , which concludes the proof.
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